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CONSPIRACY THEORIES: IS THERE A PLACE FOR
CIVIL CONSPIRACY IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION?
RICHARD AUSNESS*
I. INTRODUCTION

A civil conspiracy is a group of two or more persons acting together to
achieve an unlawful objective or to achieve a lawful objective by unlawful or
criminal means.' During the past two decades, plaintiffs have brought
numerous civil conspiracy claims against product manufacturers.2 The
defendants in these cases have included manufacturers or producers of tobacco
products, asbestos, pharmaceuticals, lead-based paint, multi-rim truck wheels,
and gasoline additives. 3 Surprisingly, less than half of the civil conspiracy
claims have made it to trial. This unimpressive success rate suggests that
courts are not very receptive to civil conspiracy claims even when there is
strong evidence of wrongdoing by product manufacturers. This article will
summarize the state of the law in this area and suggest some possible reasons
for this lukewarm judicial response to conspiracy arguments.
Part II describes some of the alleged industry-wide agreements that have
generated civil conspiracy claims in the past. These include agreements among
tobacco companies to mislead the public about the health risks of smoking,
suppression of information by asbestos insulation manufacturers about the
dangers of asbestos exposure, and the sharing of clinical data among producers
of diethylstilbestrol (DES) and their joint decision to market the drug as a
generic product. Alleged conspiracies also have included attempts by the leadbased paint industry to suppress information about the health risks of leadbased paint, the campaign by multi-rim truck wheel manufacturers to shift the
* Ashland Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968, University
of Florida; LL.M. 1973, Yale University. I would like to thank the University of Kentucky
College of Law for supporting this research with a summer research grant.
1. In re N.D. Pers. Injury Asbestos Litig. No. 1,737 F. Supp. 1087,1095 (D.N.D. 1990);
Belkow v. Celotex Corp., 722 F. Supp. 1547, 1550 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Fenestra, Inc. v. Gulf Am.
Land Corp., 141 N.W.2d 36, 48 (Mich. 1966); Triplex Commc'ns, Inc. v. Riley, 900 S.W.2d
716, 719 (Tex. 1995).
2. See, e.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp.
2d 593, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); N.D. Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. at 1090; Cousineau v. Ford
Motor Co., 363 N.W.2d 721, 725 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
3. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 106 F.3d 1245, 1245 (5th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam); MTBE, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 599 n.1; N.D. Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. at 1090;
Cousineau, 363 N.W.2d at 721; Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 761 S.W.2d 788, 788
(Tex. App. 1988); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 37 (Wis. 1984).
4. See infra Part IV.E.
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duty to warn about safety risks to employers, and the effort by the
manufacturers of the gasoline additive methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) to
mislead the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) about the dangers of
ground water contamination with this product.
Part III examines the elements of civil conspiracy, including the agreement
requirement and the overt act or independent tort requirement. It also identifies
some other collective liability theories, such as "true conspiracy," concert of
action, aiding and abetting, alternative liability, enterprise liability, and market
share liability.
Part IV discusses some of the issues that have arisen in products liability
litigation. This section examines issues associated with the agreement
requirement, including unlawful purpose, parallel conduct, and membership in
a trade association. The independent tort requirement is covered along with the
various torts that have been proposed to support a civil conspiracy claim. Part
IV also looks at the effect of civil conspiracy on statutes of limitation and
repose and considers the right to the freedoms of expression and association as
possible defenses to civil conspiracy claims.
Part V discusses some civil conspiracy concerns and suggests that they may
explain why many courts have not been receptive to conspiracy theories. One
explanation is that courts might generally disapprove of collective liability
because it undermines the principle that there must be a causal relationship
between a wrongdoer and the injured party. Another possible explanation is
that courts fear massive tort liability will cause manufacturers to overinvest in
accident cost avoidance or to withdraw useful products from the market.
Courts have also been reluctant to intrude upon defendants' First Amendment
rights of free expression and association. Finally, courts might dislike civil
conspiracy claims because they often involve issues that other branches of
government traditionally address.

II. ALLEGED CONSPIRACIES
Over the years, many litigants have alleged the existence of conspiracies by
manufacturers to bolster their damages claims against them. The defendants in
these cases have included manufacturers of tobacco products, asbestos, DES,
lead-based paint, multi-rim truck wheels, and gasoline additives.
A. Tobacco Products
According to the Department of Justice's complaint in United States v.
Philip Morris, Inc., corporate officials from American Tobacco, Brown &
Williamson, Lorillard, Philip Morris, and R.J. Repmolds met in 1953 to develop
a plan for protecting the market for cigarettes. In pursuit of this scheme,
tobacco companies allegedly issued misleading press releases, disseminated
5.

116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 136 (D.DC. 2000).
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false information in articles, destroyed or hid damaging evidence of the health
effects of smoking, and targeted their advertising and promotional efforts at
underage consumers. 6
In addition, the tobacco companies set up a Council for Tobacco Research
(CTR).7 While posing as an objective research organization, the CTR actually
devoted most of its efforts to helping tobacco companies defend lawsuits and
oppose tobacco regulation! For example, in January 1954, the CTR published
a full-page statement entitled "A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers," which
assured the public that "'distinguished authorities"' had confirmed that "' there
is no proof that cigarette smoking is one of the causes' of lung cancer." 9
Spokesmen for the tobacco industry also maintained that "the products we
make are not injurious to health," notwithstanding the fact that its own research
had found many of "the carcinogenic substances in tobacco smoke.'
The government also alleged that the tobacco industry "created ... the
Tobacco Institute (TI) [to mislead] the public, the medical establishment, the
media, and the government" about "the 'connection between smoking and
disease.""' In addition, tobacco companies agreed not to conduct in-house
research on the health effects of smoking and not to devote any resources to
developing "safe" cigarettes. 12 Furthermore, tobacco companies steadfastly
denied that nicotine was addictive and "attacked" the Surgeon General's
findings on nicotine addiction as "an unproven
attempt to find some way to
13
differentiate smoking from other behaviors.'
The government's complaint also asserted that tobacco companies
selectively bred tobacco plants to raise the concentration of nicotine in their
cigarettes but repeatedly denied that they did so.' 4 Tobacco companies also
falsely assured smokers that "light" or "low tar/low nicotine" cigarettes were
less dangerous, even though these products did not significantly lower the
health risks of smoking.' 5
Finally, the government claimed that tobacco companies targeted young
people by advertising in stores near high schools, promoting their products
heavily during school vacation, giving away free samples at places where
young people got together, paying to place their products in movies with young
audiences, advertising their products in youth-oriented magazines, and
sponsoring events primarily of interest to teenagers.16
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 136 (quoting Compl. 37).
Id.
Id. (quoting Compl. at 42).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 137-38.
Id. at 138; see also Frank J. Vandall, Reallocating the Costs of Smoking: The
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B. Asbestos
Critics of the asbestos industry have accused it of conspiring for more than
forty years to conceal the dangers of asbestos from the public. They allege
that corporate officials attended a secret meeting in 1936 and agreed to finance
experiments at the Trudeau Foundation's Saranac Laboratory at Saranac Lake,
New York. 18 The purpose of this research was not to study the health risks of
asbestos, but rather to accumulate data to help defend against potential
lawsuits.' 9 In addition, evidence later came to light that Sumner Simpson, an
executive at Raymark, intervened on several occasions to prevent articles about
the occupational health risks of asbestos exposure from being published in
Asbestos Magazine. 20 Furthermore, the Asbestos Textile Institute (ATI)
suppressed a study of textile factories by the Industrial Hygiene Foundation,
which had found evidence of asbestosis among workers.2 ' ATI refused to fund
would stir up a hornet's nest
any further studies because "such an investigation
22
and put the whole industry under suspicion.
C. Diethylstilbestrol
Stilbestrol, or synthetic estrogen, was developed in England in 1937.23 In
1940, when a number of American pharmaceutical companies sought approval
to produce and sell stilbestrol for treatment of menopausal symptoms, the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) requested that they consolidate their individual
clinical studies into a single "Master File."2 4 A working committee of drug
companies assembled the Master File and submitted it to the FDA.25 After the
FDA accepted the clinical data, the working committee was disbanded and
.26
never met again:
Other researchers subsequently discovered that estrogen treatment could
correct hormonal deficiencies that might cause miscarriages in pregnant

Application of Absolute Liability to Cigarette Manufacturers, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 405, 419-20

(1991) (declaring that tobacco companies target underage consumers).
17. PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 74
(1985); Cynthia R. Mabry, Warning! The Manufacturerof This ProductMay Have Engagedin
Cover-Ups, Lies, and Concealment: Making the Case for Limitless Punitive Awards in
Products Liability Lawsuits, 73 IND. L.J. 187, 219 (1997).
18. Ronald L. Motley & Anne McGinness Kearse, Decades of Deception: Secrets of
Lead, Asbestos, and Tobacco, TRIAL, Oct. 1999, at 46, 47.
19. Id.
20. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1317-18 (5th Cir. 1985).
21. Motley & Kearse, supra note 18, at 48.
22. Id.
23. Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (D.S.C. 1981).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1010.
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women. 27 Based on this research, several drug manufacturers sought
permission from the FDA in 1947 to market stilbestrol for treatment of
miscarriages and other pregnancy-related problems. 2 8 Each company selected
the clinical data that it wished to submit to the FDA in support of its
application.2 9 In 1952, the FDA allowed any company to market stilbestrol
for any previously approved use without filing a separate application.30
Eventually, hundreds of companies produced and sold DES. 31 Because the
drug companies marketed chemically identical DES, pharmacists treated DES
as a generic product and filled prescriptions with whatever DES they had in
stock.32 In 1971, a study first linked the daughters of women who ingested
DES during pregnancy with the development of clear cell adenocarcinoma, a
form of cancer.3 Shortly thereafter, the FDA directed DES manufacturers to
warn that "DES
[was] contraindicated for use in the prevention of
34
miscarriages.,
Injured plaintiffs alleged that drug companies conspired to procure FDA
approval for the sale of DES in 1941 and then conspired again in 1947 to
secure the FDA's permission to market DES as an anti-miscarriage drug.3 5
They also claimed that the drug companies conspired to misrepresent the safety
and efficacy of DES to physicians and their patients. 36 As proof of this
conspiracy, the plaintiffs pointed to the 1941 agreement under which the drug
companies pooled their research data and submitted the Master File to the
FDA.37
D. Lead-BasedPaint
Lead paint and pigment companies, as well as their trade associations, have
faced accusations of conspiring to suppress information about the health risks
associated with their products.3 Executives from the lead industry met in New
York City in 1928 to establish a trade association known as the Lead Industries
Association (LIA) and agreed that they would adopt a common strategy with
respect to lead-based paints.39
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.at 1010-11.
30. Id.at 1011.
31. Id.
32. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 512 F. Supp. 1031, 1034 (D. Mass. 1981).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Smith v.Eli Lilly & Co., 527 N.E.2d 333, 352 (I11.
App.Ct. 1988), rev'd in part by
560 N.E.2d 324, 337 (Ill.
1990); Collins v.Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 47 (Wis. 1984).
36. Smith, 527 N.E.2d at 352.
37. Id.
38. Scott A. Smith, Turning Lead into Asbestos and Tobacco: Litigation Alchemy Gone
Wrong, 71 DEF. COUNS. J.119, 122 (2004).
39. Motley & Kearse, supra note 18, at 47.
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Manufacturers allegedly knew of the health risks of lead-based paint but
continued to sell such products. 40 For example, between 1930 and 1945, the
lead paint industry encouraged the use of white lead in house paint even though
they were aware of lead paint's health risks. 41 Additionally, during the 1930s,
at least one company suggested that lead-based paint was safe for children by
distributing coloring books to children which featured "the little Dutch boy.'' 2
Injured plaintiffs also accused the industry of intimidating researchers and
blocking them from documenting the dangers of lead-based paint. 43 In
addition, the industry undermined the efforts of public interest organizations
and government agencies to investigate the health risks of lead paint and to
inform the public about these risks. According to some critics, "the lead[based] paint industry "'cultivated a simulacrum of concerned, responsible
'objectivity,'"" taking control of the information the public received by funding
its own research programs, and forcing its presence into the "'regulatory...
process..' ' ' ' 45 Furthermore, after scientific studies confirmed the health risks of
lead paint, the industry changed tactics and argued that the costs of removing
paint from residential buildings was not cost-effective.46
E. Multi-Rim Truck Wheels
According to the plaintiff in Cousineauv. FordMotor Co., manufacturers
of multi-rim truck wheels learned as early as the 1970s of the dangers of using
truck wheel rim parts that were manufactured by different companies.47 While
some of these rim components could be safely interchanged, in other cases
using mixed rims was highly dangerous.4 8 The plaintiff alleged that wheel-rim
manufacturers shared information about wheel rim interchangeability to
provide charts for mechanics but otherwise sought to shift the burden entirely to
those who changed truck tires.4 9 Specifically, the wheel rim manufacturers
urged the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to
promulgate standards that would "remove all of the burden from the Wheel and
40. Santiago v. Sherwin Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546, 552 (1st Cir. 1993).
41. Id. at 552; Brenner v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 732 N.Y.S.2d 799,801 (App. Div. 2001)
(mem.).
42. Lisa A. Perillo, Note, ScrapingBeneath the Surface: FinallyHolding Lead-Based
Paint Manufacturers Liable by Applying Public Nuisance and Market-Share Liability
Theories?, 32 HOFsTRA L. REv. 1039, 1048-49 (2004).
43. Id.
44. Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo 'sRetort: PeterHuber'sJunk Scholarship,42 AM. U. L.
REv. 1637, 1683-84 (1993).
45. Perillo, supra note 42, at 1071 (quoting id. at 1683-84 (quoting Paul Mushak, The
Landmark Needleman Study ofChildhoodLeadPoisoning: Scientific and SocialAftermath, 2
PSR Q. 165, 169 (1992)).
46. Id. at 1071-72.
47. 363 N.W.2d 721, 726 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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Rim manufacturers" and instead require employers to protect their mechanics
against this risk. 50 OSHA eventually responded by directing employers to post
information about mounting multi-rim truck wheels and requiring them to
provide better training for mechanics who changed truck tires with multi-rim
wheels.5 1
F. Gasoline Additives
The plaintiffs in In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Products
Liability Litigation brought a class action against MTBE manufacturers,
claiming that they conspired to deceive the EPA to persuade the agencr to
permit gasoline refiners to put greater amounts of MTBE in their gasoline. In
1990, a federal statute created the Reformulated Gasoline Program (RFG
Program), which required gasoline suppliers to use reformulated gasoline in
metropolitan areas with high ozone levels. 53 The higher oxygen levels in
reformulated gasoline caused it to burn more cleanly, thereby producing fewer
volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions.54 Refiners often added MTBE to
increase their gasoline's oxygen content. 55 According to the plaintiffs,
however, MTBE was highly soluble in water, making it a threat to water wells
and reservoirs if it seeped into underground aquifers.56 In addition, the
plaintiffs charged that MTBE was an animal carcinogen and was also thought
to cause health problems in humans.57 The plaintiffs' complaint stated that by
1980 MTBE producers knew MTBE was contaminating groundwater supplies
in some areas. 58 In addition, they learned of MTBE's health risks in 1986 when
a study known as the Garrett Report identified the threat of MTBE
contamination and concluded that MTBE should not be used as a gasoline
additive.5 9
Although MTBE producers knew about the dangers linked to MTBE, the
plaintiffs claimed that they allegedly conspired to deceive the EPA to convince
6
the agency to authorize raising the amount of MTBE permitted in gasoline. 0
According to the plaintiffs, gasoline additive producers "formed the MTBE
Committee for the purpose of addressing environmental, health, safety,
legislative and regulatory issues concerning MTBE.' On February 27, 1987,
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 601-602 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(5), (6), (10)(D) (2000); MTBE, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(3)(B)(i) (2000); MTBE, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
MTBE, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
Id. at 599.
Id.
Id. at 600-601.
Id. at 601.
Id. at 601-02.
Id. at 602.
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the MTBE Committee falsely assured the EPA "that MTBE was only slightly
soluble in water, [that the risk of] exposure to MTBE was low, and that MTBE
[was] biodegrada[ble].' 62 In addition, the plaintiffs asserted that the MTBE
Committee assured the EPA that MTBE did not threaten public health or the
environment.63 The plaintiffs further alleged that a member of the MTBE
Committee stated that MTBE gasoline spills were no longer a concern to the
environment and that in 1994, the American Petroleum Institute, another
industry trade association, affirmed that there was no reason to be concerned
about the continued use of MTBE. 64 Finally, the plaintiffs asserted that the
Oxygenated Fuels Association (OFA), another industry trade group, falsely
stated that federal regulations and industry practices had almost completely
eliminated MTBE contamination.6 5

III. OVERVIEW OF CIVIL CONSPIRACY LAW
Most courts agree that civil conspiracy involves: (1) an agreement to
commit an unlawful act or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, (2) the
commission of an overt act for the purpose of furthering the consp
(3)
causation, and (4) damage to another resulting from the conspiracy.6 Problems
with pleading and proving the elements of civil conspiracy make alternative
theories of liability somewhat more attractive.
A. The Agreement Requirement
First, there must be some sort of agreement between the defendant and at
least one other party to commit a wrongful act.67 Thus, one who is accidentally,
inadvertently, or negligently involved in an illegal scheme will not be held
liable for civil conspiracy. 68 Nor is mere knowledge that others are committing

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. E.g., Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 534 A.2d 706, 709 (N.H. 1987); see, e.g.,
Sonnenreich v. Philip Morris, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 416, 419 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Nicolet, Inc. v.
Nutt, 525 A.2d 146, 149-50 (Del. 1987).
67. MTBE, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 634; Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1012
(D.S.C. 1981); Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 172 (Iowa 2002); see also Hosp.
Care Corp. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 9 S.E.2d 796, 800-01 (S.C. 1940) (stating that "it is
incomprehensible that a single agent may... conspire with himself' (quoting Goble v. Am. Ry.
Express Co., 115 S.E. 900, 903 (S.C. 1923)) and "[t]o give action there must ... be...
conspiracy to do a wrongful act. If the act is lawful, no matter how many unite to do it"
(quoting William G. Werth Trading v. Fire Cos.' Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 171 S.E. 255, 259
(Va. 1933))).
68. Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985,993 (7th Cir. 1988); MTBE, 175 F. Supp. 2d

at 634; RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 876 cmt. e (1979).
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fraudulent or illegal actions enough to make one part of a conspiracy. 69 At the
same time, one who understands the general goals of an illegal scheme and
agrees to further them will be treated as a conspirator, even if that person does
not agree to the details of the scheme or know the identity of all the
conspirators.7 °
B. The Overt Act or Independent Tort Requirement
A mere agreement will not amount to a civil conspiracy; 7' there must also
be some illegal or tortious act committed by at least one of the parties to carry
out the objectives of the agreement.72 One important issue is whether the act
must amount to an intentional tort or whether negligence or strict liability will
suffice. Most courts have held that the parties must commit an intentional tort 73
and that, therefore, negligence will not satisfy the independent tort
requirement. 74 When the plaintiff tries to base a civil conspiracy on negligence,
a number of courts have responded that one cannot conspire to commit
negligence. 75 A few courts, however, have 77allowed civil conspiracy claims
6
based on negligence1 or even strict liability.

69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (requiring assistance or encouragement
in order to incur liability for knowledge of another's tortious conduct); see alsoJones, 856 F.2d
at 992 (requiring voluntary participation in the conduct).
70. Jones, 856 F.2d at 992; MTBE, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 634; Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd.,
645 N.E.2d 888, 894 (Ill. 1994).
71. Estate of White v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 F. Supp. 2d 424, 428 (D. Md.
2000); In reN.D. Pers. Injury Asbestos Litig. No. 1,737 F. Supp. 1087, 1095 (D.N.D. 1990);
Belkow v. Celotex Corp., 722 F. Supp. 1547, 1550 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 761 S.W.2d 788, 796 (Tex. App. 1988).
72. Estate of White, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 428; N.D. Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. at 1095;
Belkow, 722 F. Supp. at 1550; Rogers, 761 S.W.2d at 796.
73. E.g., Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1012 (D.S.C. 1981); Altman v.
Fortune Brands, Inc., 701 N.Y.S.2d 615,615 (App. Div. 2000) (mem.); Geiger v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 696 N.Y.S.2d 345, 350 (Sup. Ct. 1999); Goldstein v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 854 A.2d 585,
590 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
74. Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1012; Goldstein, 854 A.2d at 590.
75. MTBE, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 633; Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 391,
395 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Sonnenreich v. Philip Morris Inc., 929 F. Supp. 416,419-20 (S.D. Fla.
1996); Rogers v. Furlow, 699 F. Supp. 672, 675 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Campbell v. A.H. Robins Co.,
615 F. Supp. 496, 500 (W.D. Wis. 1985); Firestone Steel Prods. Co. v. Barajas, 927 S.W.2d
608, 614 (Tex. 1996); Triplex Commc'ns, Inc. v. Riley, 900 S.W.2d 716, 720 n.2 (Tex. 1995).
But see Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 173 (Iowa 2002) ("We disagree with
those courts that conclude an agreement to be negligent is a non sequitur.").
76. Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 645 N.E.2d 888, 894-95 (Ill. 1994); Wright, 652 N.W.2d
at 174.
77. MTBE, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 634.
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C. Pleadingand Proof
In the federal courts, Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) merely requires "a short
and plain statement" of the grounds for the claim. 8 Nevertheless, when the
underlying tort is fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment, the
plaintiff must also comply with the requirement of Rule 9(b) that "[i]n all
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake
shall be stated with particularity."7 9 This latter requirement may impose a
serious burden on the plaintiff in a civil conspiracy case. For example, in
Belkow v. Celotex Corp.,80 a federal district court dismissed the plaintiff's
conspiracy claim because his complaint failed to provide explicit details about
the "time, place and alleged effect of the conspiracy.",81 Another federal district
court reached a similar conclusion in Carlson v. Armstrong World Industries,
Inc.82 The plaintiff in Carlsonalleged that the defendant asbestos companies
conspired to fraudulently conceal information about the health risks of exposure
to asbestos products.83 The court observed that Rule 9(b) required the plaintiff
to state his claim for fraud with particularity.84 In this case, however, the court
found that the conspiracy claims were "vague, general, and conclusory" and,
therefore, were not specific enough to satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b). 5
D. Civil Conspiracyand Other Liability Theories
Other theories besides civil conspiracy are available to impose joint and
several liability on a group of wrongdoers. These include: (1) "true
conspiracy," (2) concert of action, (3) aiding and abetting, (4) enterprise
liability, (5) alternative liability, and (6) market share liability.
1. "True Conspiracy"
A true conspiracy exists when the defendants, "acting in unison, exercise a
'peculiar power of coercion' over the plaintiff that they would not have had if

78. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see also Town of Hooksett Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 617
F. Supp. 126, 135 (D.N.H. 1984) (requiring a claim alleging fraud or conspiracy to meet the
requirement of Rule 9(b)).
80. 722 F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Ill. 1989.
81. Id. at 1551 (quoting 2A Moore's Federal Practice 8.17[6] (2d ed. 1960).
82. 693 F. Supp. 1073 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
83. Id. at 1078.
84. Id.
1994) (observing
85. Id. But see Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 645 N.E.2d 888, 895 (I11.,
that "conspiracies are often purposefully shrouded in mystery... [and] by their very nature do
not permit the plaintiff to allege, with complete particularity, all of the details of the conspiracy
or the exact role of the defendants in the conspiracy").
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they acted alone., 86 In contrast to civil conspiracy, a true conspiracy is itself an
independent tort; therefore, the plaintiff does not have to prove the existence of
an underlying tort. 87 True conspiracy is quite narrow in its focus8 8 and is
largely confined to economic boycotts and illegal interferences with business
relationships. 89 Consequently, this tort has little application to personal injury
claims in product liability actions.
2. Concert of Action
Concert of action is a theory that subjects defendants to joint and several
liability when they act together to commit tortious conduct. 90 Furthermore, one
who negligently or intentionally commits a tort may be held jointly and
severally liable even though his or her conduct is not the direct cause of the
plaintiff's injury. 9' Concert of action requires: (1) "an understanding, express
or tacit, to participate in a common plan to commit a tortious act," (2) that each
party act tortiously, and (3) that one of the parties commits a tortious act to
carry out the agreement. 9' Concert of action cases typically involve only one
plaintiff, a few defendants, and a short time between the commission of the tort
and the discovery of that tort.9 3 Unlike some liability theories such as
alternative liability, a plaintiff can rely upon concert of action when the identity
of the person who caused the injury is known. 94

86. Johnson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 194,208 n.1 (D.
Mass. 2000) (quoting Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. P & B Autobody, 43 F.3d 1546, 1563 (1st Cir.
1994)); Buckner v. Lower Fla. Keys Hosp. Dist., 403 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
87. Buckner, 403 So. 2d at 1029, cited with approval in Carlson v. Armstrong World
Indus., Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1073, 1078 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
88. Aetna, 43 F.3d at 1563; Liappas v. Augousits, 47 So. 2d 582, 583 (Fla. 1950).
89. Leonard A. Washofsky, Note, Offenses and Quasi-Offenses--Conspiracy--Civil
Action for "True Conspiracy," 33 TUL. L. REV. 410,413 (1959); see alsoLiappas,47 So. 2d at
583 (finding conspiracy "in the combined action of groups of employers or employees... and
related or similar fields"); Fleming v. Dane, 22 N.E.2d 609, 611 (Mass. 1939) (declaring that
"[t]he most common illustration of such a 'conspiracy' is to be found in the combined actions of
groups of employers or employees, where through the power of combination pressure is created
and results brought about different in kind from anything that could have been accomplished by
separate individuals").
90. Ryan v. Eli Lilly& Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1015 (D.S.C. 1981); Rastelliv. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 591 N.E.2d 222, 224 (N.Y. 1992); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539
N.E.2d 1069, 1074 (N.Y. 1989).
91. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 512 F. Supp. 1031, 1035 (D. Mass. 1981); Cousineau v. Ford
Motor Co., 363 N.W.2d 721, 728 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
92. DAVID OWEN ET AL., 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIASILrry § 24:3 (3d ed. 2000);
accordSackmanv. Liggett Group, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 391,396 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Rastelli, 591
N.E.2d at 224; see Marshall v. Celotex Corp., 691 F. Supp. 1045, 1047 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
93. Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 726 (Haw. 1991).
94. Cutter Biol., 823 P.2d at 726 (citing Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 176
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3. Aiding and Abetting
To establish a claim for aiding and abetting, the plaintiff must show that:
(1) the principal or active defendant committed a tortious or illegal act, (2) the
defendant was aware of the violation, and (3) the defendant gave "substantial
assistance or encouragement" to the active defendant to commit the act.95 In
determining whether the substantial assistance requirement is met, "the nature
of the act encouraged, the amount of assistance given by the defendant, his
presence or absence at the time of the tort, his relation to the other and his state
of mind are all considered. 96 Unlike civil conspiracy, in an aiding and abetting
case, the plaintiff does not have to prove that an agreement exists between the
parties.97
4. Alternative Liability
Alternative liability requires: (1) that all defendants be joined in the
lawsuit and (2) that the defendants either have more knowledge than the
plaintiff about the identity of the person who caused the plaintiff's injury or are
responsible for the plaintiff's inability to identify that person.98 This rule
assumes that where each of the defendants breached a duty to the plaintiff and
it is sufficiently likely that any one of them was the culprit, it is fair to force
each of them to exonerate himself or be held liable for the plaintiff's injury. 99
Some courts have applied alternative liability in products liability cases, 00
while other courts have refused to do so.' 01
(Mich. 1984)).
95. Christian v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 951, 960 (D. Md. 2001)
(quoting Alleco Inc. v. Harry & Jeanette Weinberg Found., Inc., 665 A.2d 1038, 1043 (Md.
1995)); Payton, 512 F. Supp. at 1035 (citing Brown v. Perkins, 1861 WL 4391, at *5 (Mass.
1861)).

96. Payton, 512 F. Supp. at 1035 (quoting

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 876 &

cmt. d (1979)).
97. Payton, 512 F. Supp. at 1035 (citing Brown, 1861 WL 4391, at *5).
98. Ryanv. Eli Lilly& Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1016 (D.S.C. 1981); see OWENETAL.,
supra note 86, § 24:4.
99. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 928 (Cal. 1980); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
539 N.E.2d 1069, 1074 (N.Y. 1989); OWEN ET AL., supra note 86, § 24:4.
100. Gard v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 229 Cal. Rptr. 861, 869 (Ct. App. 1986); Abel v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 172-73 (Mich. 1984); McGuinness v. Wakefern Corp., 608 A.2d
447, 450-51 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991); Minnich v. Ashland Oil Co., 473 N.E.2d 1199,
1200 (Ohio 1984).
101. Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581, 582-83 (5th Cir. 1983);
Univ. Sys. of N.H. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 756 F. Supp. 640, 654 (D.N.H. 1991); Marshall v.
Celotex Corp., 651 F. Supp. 389, 392-93 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Nutt v.A.C. & S. Co., 517 A.2d
690, 694 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986); Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 725 (Haw.
1991); Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1074; Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d
691, 699 (Ohio 1987); Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 665 A.2d 1288, 1292 (Pa. Super.
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5. Enterprise Liability

The theory of enterprise liability subjects each member of an industry to
joint and several liability when:
(1)the injury-causing product was manufactured by one of a small number of
defendants in an industry; (2) the defendants had joint knowledge of the risks
inherent in the product and possessed a joint capacity to reduce those risks;
and (3) each of them failed to take steps to reduce
0 2 the risk but, rather,
delegated this responsibility to a trade association.1
Courts have specifically rejected enterprise liability when a large number of
manufacturers belong to the industry and the plaintiff has not joined most of its
members in the lawsuit. 103 This makes it difficult for plaintiffs to rely on the
enterprise liability theory as an alternative to civil conspiracy in the types of
large class actions discussed in this Article.
6. Market Share Liability
The theory of market share liability provides that one who is injured by a
generic or fungible product may recover damages from each producer based on
its share of the total market for the product.' °4 For market share liability to
apply, the plaintiff must be unable to identify the manufacturer whose product
caused the harm and the plaintiff must join a sufficient number of defendants in
the action to constitute a substantial share of the product's market.'0 5 The
California Supreme Court first introduced market share liability in Sindell v.
0 6
Abbott Laboratories.'
The plaintiffs in Sindell developed cancer as a result of
their mothers' use of DES. 0 7 They brought suit against eleven named and 100
Ct. 1995); Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 748 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. App. 1988).
102. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593,
622 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); accordUniv. Sys. of N.H., 756 F. Supp. at 656; Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
103. ATBE, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 622; Univ. Sys. ofN.H., 756 F. Supp. at 657 (noting that
plaintiff's reliance on enterprise liability against a small group of asbestos manufacturers
"misses the point of the theory," which "seeks to hold all manufacturers... liable"); Ryan, 514
F. Supp. at 1017; Sindell, 607 P.2d at 935; Cutter Biol., 823 P.2d at 727; Smith v. Eli Lilly&
Co., 527 N.E.2d 333, 351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Burnside v. Abbott Labs., 505 A.2d 973, 985
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 379-80 (Wash. 1984). But cf
Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E.2d 185-86, 185 n.5 (N.Y. 1982) (noting that "it has been
suggested that [enterprise] liability is applicable to the DES cause" but expressly refusing to
decide the issue).
104. See David A. Fischer, ProductsLiability-An Analysis ofMarket Share Liability, 34
VAND. L. REv. 1623, 1626 (1981).
105. Id.at 1626, 1635.
106. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
107. Id. at 925.
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unnamed DES manufacturers but were unable to identify the manufacturers
who actually caused their injuries.'0 8 Nevertheless, the California court held
that the plaintiffs could recover a pro rata amount of their damages from each
DES manufacturer based on its market share during the time the plaintiffs were
exposed to the drug.' 0 9 Although a number of courts have applied some form
1
of market share liability in DES cases," 0 some others have
12 declined to do so,"
DES.'
involve
not
did
that
cases
in
used
rarely
is
and it
III. CIVIL CONSPIRACY AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY

Injured plaintiffs have invoked civil conspiracy against a variety of product
manufacturers, including producers of cigarettes, asbestos, pharmaceuticals,
lead-based paint, multi-rim truck wheels, and gasoline additives. A number of
issues of proof and jurisdiction have arisen in these cases.

108. Id. at 925-26.
109. Fischer, supra note 98, at 1635-36 (citing id. at 937).
110. McCormack v. Abbott Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1529 (D. Mass. 1985); McElhaney
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265, 270-71 (D.S.D. 1983); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539
N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 381 (Wash. 1984)
(rejecting the Sindell theory but adopting a similar modification of alternate liability); Collins v.
Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 49 (Wis. 1984) (rejecting strict market share liability but holding
that market share could be a relevant factor in apportionment of comparative negligence among
named defendants).
111. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 344-45 (Ill. 1990) (rejecting the appellate
court's adoption of modified market share liability as a "flawed concept" that "is too great a
deviation from" established principles of tort law); accordTidier v. Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d
418, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Morton v. Abbott Labs., 538 F. Supp. 593, 599-600 (M.D. Fla.
1982); Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589, 596 (D.S.C. 1981); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
514 F. Supp. 1004, 1018 (D.S.C. 1981). In each of these cases except Smith, a federal judge
was bound by established state tort law or was unwilling to adopt a novel liability theory
without clear evidence that the state courts would have done the same. Tidier, 851 F.2d at 424;
Morton, 538 F. Supp. at 599-600; Mizell, 526 F. Supp. at 596; Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1018.
112. E.g., Bateman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 1132, 1133 (5th Cir. 1986)
(asbestos litigation); Dawson v. Bristol Labs., 658 F. Supp. 1036, 1040-41 (W.D. Ky. 1987)
(tetracycline litigation); Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co., 192 Cal. Rptr. 870, 880 (Ct. App. 1983)
(Salk polio vaccine litigation); Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 1985)
(asbestos litigation); Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d 511, 529 (N.J. 1989) (DPT vaccine
litigation); Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1067-68 (N.Y. 2001) (handgun
litigation); Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691,701 (Ohio 1987) (asbestos
litigation); see also Andrew R. Klein, Beyond DES: Rejecting the Application of Market Share
Liability in BloodProductsLitigation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 883, 918-23 (1994) (discussing market
share liability in blood products litigation). But see In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE)
Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (gasoline additive litigation).
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A. The Agreement Requirement
1. Unlawful Purpose

The agreement requirement caused serious problems for the plaintiff in
Cousineau v. FordMotor Co. 3 The plaintiff's son had been killed when the
wheel he was repairing "explosively disengaged."' 14 The plaintiff sued the
wheel manufacturers who had supplied the employer's truck wheel stock and
the manufacturers of the trucks owned by the employer. ' 15 When the plaintiff
was unable to identify the manufacturer whose product caused the injury, she
tried to add a concert of action count to her complaint to overcome this
problem." 6 On appeal, the court found that the plaintiff's claim was essentially
that the defendants conspired to make product identification difficult." 17 As the
court observed, the plaintiff failed to show why such an agreement was
unlawful." 8 Because there was no agreement to act unlawfully, there was no
legal basis for the plaintiff's concert of action claim." 9
The defendants in the MTBE case also argued that there could be no civil
conspiracy because there was no evidence of an unlawful agreement. 2 In that
case, however, the "plaintiffs allege[d that the] defendants formed joint task
forces and committees such as the MTBE Committee .

.

. for the express

purpose of suppressing or minimizing information regarding MTBE
hazards.' 21 In addition, the plaintiffs accused the defendants of plotting to
deceive the government and the public about these dangers.
These
23
allegations were sufficient to support a claim of an unlawful agreement.1
2. Parallel Conduct
Because conspiracy is sometimes difficult to prove directly, courts often
allow plaintiffs to introduce circumstantial evidence. 24 "[P]arallel conduct
may serve as circumstantial evidence of a civil conspiracy,"' 5 but a great many
113. 363 N.W.2d 721, 731 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
114. Id. at 725.
115. Id.
116. Id. The plaintiff also attempted to add an alternative liability claim, which failed
because in theory she could have discovered the identity of the specific wheel and truck
manufactuers involved in her son's death. Id. at 727-28.
117. Id.at731.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593,
634 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 635.
124. See Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 645 N.E.2d 888, 895 (I11.1994).
125. McClure v. Owens Coming Fiberglas Corp., 720 N.E.2d 242, 259 (I11.1999).
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courts refuse to allow a plaintiff to prove the existence of a conspiracy by
evidence of parallel conduct alone. 2 6 At least one court held that evidence of
parallel conduct among asbestos manufacturers is not sufficient to satisfy the
agreement requirement in a civil conspiracy action. 27 In McClure v. Owens
Corning Fiberglas Corp., z8 the plaintiffs sued a number of asbestos
manufacturers for conspiring to suppress information about the harmful effects
of asbestos exposure.129 The plaintiffs could not offer any direct evidence that
the asbestos companies agreed to conceal information about the health risks of
asbestos but offered evidence of parallel conduct by these companies as proof
of such an agreement. 130 The Illinois Supreme Court held that parallel conduct
constitutes circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy between manufacturers of
the same product
3 1 but does not, without more, prove that there actually was such
conspiracy.'
a
Several DES cases have also held that parallel conduct is not sufficient to
satisfy the agreement requirement. For example, the plaintiff in Collins v. Eli
Lilly Co.'3 2 brought suit against various manufacturers of DES for injuries
caused by her mother's ingestion of the drug during pregnancy. 133 Because the
134
plaintiff could not identify the DES manufacturer that caused her injuries,
she included allegations that the defendants had "conspired to misrepresent that
126. Id. (declaring that "[o]ur review of the case law from other jurisdictions convinces us
that the overwhelming weight of authority has refused to accept mere parallel action as proof of
conspiracy"); see also In re Asbestos School Litig., 46 F.3d 1284, 1294 (3d Cir. 1994)
(concluding that "we do not see how a rational jury could find the existence of a civil conspiracy
... based solely on the alleged fact that Pfizer and other defendants consciously engaged in
parallel conduct"); Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 412 A.2d 466, 472 (Pa. 1979) (stating
that "[tihe mere fact that two or more person, each with the right to do a thing, happen to do that
thing at the same time is not by itself an actionable conspiracy"); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342
N.W.2d 37, 47-48 (Wis. 1984) (observing that "the drug companies apparently engaged in
parallel behavior in both 1941 and 1947, but parallel behavior alone cannot prove agreement").
Compare Burnside v. Abbot Labs., 505 A.2d 973, 982 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), in which the
court affirmed the dismissal of a civil conspiracy claim based on a parallel absence of conduct.
That court found that the plaintiffs had failed to describe how the manufacturers carried out the
conspiratorial scheme and had "alleged no[thing] more than a contemporaneous and negligent
failure" to test the drug or warn about its potential dangers. Id.According to the court, "[tihis
was insufficient to state either a conspiratorial agreement or the requisite intent to cause injury."
Id.
127. McClure, 720 N.E.2d at 259.
128. 720 N.E.2d 242.
129. Id.at 245-46.
130. Id. at 247. The plaintiffs also presented evidence of several contacts among the
defendants, but the court found these contacts insufficient to support an inference of an
agreement. Id.at 264.
131. Id.at259.
132. 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984).
133. Id. at41-42.
134. Id.at 43.

PRODUCTSLIABILITY CONSPIRACY

2007]

DES was safe and efficacious for use by pregnant women" and that they acted
together to manufacture and market the drug. 13
As evidence of this
conspiracy, the plaintiff claimed that the drug companies had pooled their
clinical data and filed a joint New Drug Application (NDA) with the FDA in
1941 to produce and market DES. 136 Later, in 1947 and 1948, several drug
companies filed supplemental
1 37 NDAs with the FDA to market DES for
prevention of miscarriages.'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged that the drug companies
engaged in parallel actions in 1941 and 1947 but declared that this conduct
alone could not prove that there was an underlying agreement to commit an
unlawful act. 138 The plaintiff presented no evidence that the defendants
cooperated with each other to misrepresent the "safety and efficacy" of DES to
obtain FDA approval of the drug. 139 Furthermore, even if the cooperative
efforts of 1941 constituted an agreement, there was no basis for concluding that
the agreement covered the NDA filings in 1947 and 1948.140 Consequently, the
court affirmed the lower court's summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's
civil conspiracy claim. 141
3. Membership in a Trade Association
A trade organization can be held liable under civil conspiracy even though
it does not manufacture or supply defective products to consumers.142 Thus, in
Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 143 a Texas court found a viable claim the
plaintiff s civil conspiracy case against a tobacco industry trade association and
an industry-sponsored research and public relations organization.'" In another
case, Jefferson v. Lead IndustriesAss 'n,14 5 the trade association of the leadbased paint industry escaped a similar fate only because the plaintiff was unable
to prove all of the
elements of the underlying tort, namely fraudulent
1 46
misrepresentation.
On the other hand, at least one court has declared that mere membership in
a trade association will not cause innocent members to be held liable for civil
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 42.
Id.at43.
Id.at 43-44.
Id.at 47-48.
Id.at 48.
Id.
See id.at 42, 47.
See Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 761 S.W.2d 788, 797-98, 799-800 (Tex.

App. 1988).
143. 761 S.W.2d 788.
144. Id.at 797-98, 799-800.
145. 106 F.3d 1245 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
146. Id.at 1252, 1254 (finding that "the district court not only reached the correct result
but did so for the correct reasons" and appending the lower court opinion to its own).
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4 In Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 148 an
conspiracy. 1147
amicus brief filed on
behalf of defendant tobacco companies expressed a concern that " [e]very
company that belongs to a trade association, industry group, or product
advisory group would face conspiracy charges predicated on nothing more than
the fact that it manufactured a product that had characteristics of those within
that industry."",149 The Iowa Supreme Court responded that only members of
the association who knowingly participated in a conspiracy would be held
liable. 150 In other words, an agreement to commit an unlawful act was still
necessary to be held liable for civil conspiracy and "mere membership" in a
trade association did not amount to such an agreement.15'

B. The Overt Act or Independent Tort Requirement
1. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Many civil conspiracy cases against tobacco companies have centered on
the overt act or underlying tort requirement. 152 In most instances, the overt act
or underlying tort complained of was fraudulent misrepresentation' 5 3 or
fraudulent concealment.' 4 Where the claim was fraudulent misrepresentation,
the case has often turned on whether all of the underlying tort's elements were
properly pleaded. 55 A fraudulent misrepresentation claim requires proof of six
elements by clear and convincing evidence:
1) a representation; 2) which is material to the transaction at hand; 3) made
falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is true or
false; 4) with the intent of misleading another into relying on it; 5)justifiable
reliance on the misrepresentation;
and 6) the resulting injury was proximately
56
caused by the reliance.

147.
148.

See Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 174 (Iowa 2002).
652 N.W.2d 159.

149. Id.at 173 (alteration in original) (quoting an amicus brief filed in the case).
150. Id.
at 174.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 446 (3d Cir.
2000); Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 391, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Wright, 652
N.W.2d at 172; Altman v. Fortune Brands, Inc., 701 N.Y.S.2d 615, 615 (App. Div. 2000)
(mem.); Geiger v. Am. Tobacco Co., 696 N.Y.S.2d 345, 350 (Sup. Ct. 1999); Goldstein v.
Phillip Morris, Inc., 854 A.2d 585, 590 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 761 S.W.2d 788, 796 (Tex. App. 1988).
153. See, e.g., Johnson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 194,20708 (D. Mass. 2000); Estate of White v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 F. Supp. 2d 424, 428
(D. Md. 2000); Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1012 (D.S.C. 1981).
154. See infra Part IV.B.2.
155. See, e.g., Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 207-208.
156. Goldstein, 854 A.2d at 590-91 (citing Debbs v. Chrysler Corp., 810 A.2d 137, 155
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Even when the claim has been properly alleged, plaintiffs often have trouble
satisfying the burden of proof for the reliance requirement of fraudulent
misrepresentation.' 5 7
Johnson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.58 is illustrative of this
problem. In Johnson, the widow of a deceased smoker brought suit against
Brown & Williamson, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and civil
conspiracy. 159 In her fraudulent misrepresentation claim, the plaintiff
maintained that her husband had "'relied upon the manufacturer's superior
knowledge regarding tobacco products and was impliedly or expressly
instructed in their use by the advertising, marketing and other efforts of the
defendant... ,,,160 The court, however, concluded that the plaintiff needed to
identify more specifically the time, place, and content of the defendant's false
6
statements or deceptions upon which the decedent smoker had relied.' '
Without this, the plaintiff would not have met the pleading requirements of
Rule 9(b) 162 or the reliance element
of fraudulent misrepresentation, so the civil
63
conspiracy claim would fail. 1
Likewise, in Estate of White v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co., 164 the plaintiffs
claimed that the decedent's long-time smoking habit indicated that he had
relied upon the defendant's advertising and promotion activities.165 The court
determined that "there [was] no evidence that [the decedent] ever saw or heard
anything that B & W or RJR said" and concluded that the plaintiffs failed to
prove that the decedent relied on any of the defendants' statements or
advertising. 166 The plaintiffs also asked the court to presume that the decedent
would have seen or heard the defendants' misrepresentations-and relied on
them--"because [he] read the newspaper and magazines, watched television,
and listened to the radio where these misrepresentations were made. ' 67 The
court, however, concluded that such a presumption would be nothing more than
pure speculation and, therefore, dismissed the plaintiffs' civil conspiracy
claim.

(Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)).
157. E.g., Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 377 F.3d 917, 926 (8th Cir. 2004); Estate of
White, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 429-30; see, e.g., Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1013.
158. 122 F. Supp. 2d 194.
159. Id. at 198.
160. Id. at 207 (quoting Compl. 21).
161. Id. at 208.
162. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.").
163. Id. at 207-08.
164. 109 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D. Md. 2000).
165. Id. at 429.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 430.
168. Id.
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In Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 169 the plaintiff alleged that the defendants
engaged in a collective promotional and marketing scheme to fraudulently
misrepresent stilbestrol's benefits. 70 Unfortunately for the plaintiff, her
physician testified that he completely disregarded the promotional and
marketing campaigns of any defendant regarding stilbestrol and relied only on
reports and studies in the medical literature by independent doctors and
scientists. 17 1 Thus, even if the defendants had fraudulently misrepresented
DES's benefits, the plaintiff's fraud claim failed because she was unable to
show that either she or her physician had relied upon these fraudulent
representations. 7 2
Finally, in Brennerv. American CyanamidCo.,1 a civil conspiracy action
against lead-based paint manufacturers was dismissed because the plaintiffs
could not establish the existence of fraud as an independent tort.'74 The
plaintiff accused the defendants of fraud for "promoting the use of lead
pigments in their paint without proper tests or warnings ... ,,175 The court,
however, concluded that the plaintiffs had "failed to raise a triable issue of fact
concerning the reliance element" and dismissed their fraud and conspiracy
claims. 176
2. Fraudulent Concealment
Some plaintiffs have identified fraudulent concealment as the underlying
tort in civil conspiracy actions. Fraudulent concealment requires proof of: (1)
deliberate hiding by the defendant of a material fact, or silence when there is a
duty to speak, (2) "[tlhat the defendant acted with scienter," (3) intent to cause
(4) causation, and (5) "damages
the plaintiff to rely upon the concealment,
177
resulting from the concealment.'
The duty requirement has been especially troublesome for plaintiffs basing
their civil conspiracy claim on fraudulent concealment. 178 For example, in
Viguers v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 179 a Pennsylvania appellate court upheld
the dismissal of a civil conspiracy claim. 180 The court acknowledged that

169. 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981).
170. Id. at 1012-13.
171. Id. at 1013.
172. Id.
173. 732 N.Y.S.2d 799 (App. Div. 2001) (mem.).
174. Id. at 800.
175. Id. at 801.
176. Id.
177. Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt, 525 A.2d 146, 149 (Del. 1987).
178. E.g., Estate of White v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 F. Supp. 2d 442, 430 (D.
Md. 2000); Chavers v. Gatke Corp., 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198, 203 (Ct. App. 2003); Viguers v.
Philip Morris USA, Inc., 837 A.2d 534, 540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
179. 837 A.2d 534.
180. Id. at 540.
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concealment would constitute "actionable fraud if the seller intentionally
concealed a material fact to deceive the purchaser . . . ."' 8 The court also
observed that silence alone would not amount to fraud unless the defendant had
a duty to speak. 8 2 The court implied that a duty to speak did not exist and
the dangers
found that there was no evidence that the defendant's silence about
83
of smoking actually caused the decedent to continue smoking.1
In Chavers v. Gatke Corp.,'84 the plaintiff stated that manufacturers of
friction brake products conspired to conceal a study showing that exposure to
products containing asbestos could be harmful. 8 5 The jury considered the civil
86
conspiracy claim on the basis of concealment and found for the defendant. 1
On appeal, a California appellate court declared that a conspiracy could "only
be formed by parties who are already under a duty to the plaintiff, the breach of
which will support a cause of action against them-individually and not as
conspirators-in tort.' 1 87 In this case, the court found that the defendant did
not owe a duty to the plaintiff because he was not exposed to the defendant's
8
products. 88
The plaintiffs were more successful in Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt. 9 In that case,
asbestos workers claimed that the defendant participated in a conspiracy to
conceal information about the health risks of asbestos. 90 The court
distinguished between deliberate concealment of material facts and "silence in
the face of a duty to speak."' 191 According to the court, a defendant would not
be liable for fraudulent concealment for merely failing to disclose a material
fact unless he had a duty to speak; nevertheless, a defendant who "actively
conceal[ed] a material fact" would be liable regardless of whether there was a
duty to speak. 192 The court concluded that fraudulent concealment would
support a civil conspiracy claim if the defendant participated in a conspiracy
that actively concealed information about the health risks of asbestos
exposure. 193
Finally, in the Fifth JudicialDistrictAsbestos Litigation,94 workers who
were exposed to asbestos sued Metropolitan Life Insurance Company for
failing to disclose information about the dangers of asbestos which the
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198 (Ct. App. 2003).
185. Id.at 200.
186. Id. The jury also found there was no conspiracy to make intentional
misrepresentations. Id.
187. Id.at 203.
188. Id
189. 525 A.2d 146 (Del. 1987).
190. Id.at 147.
191. Id. at 149.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 150.
194. In re Fifth Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litig., 784 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
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company had obtained in the 1930s from medical examinations of asbestos
workers. 195 Although the study allegedly showed "that a high percentage of
[these workers] suffered from asbestosis," the defendant declined to publish
any such findings in a medical journal. 196 When Metropolitan did publish
another study, the asbestos industry persuaded it to misrepresent the seriousness
of asbestos-related diseases. 197 Despite strong evidence of a conspiracy among
asbestos manufacturers, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, 98 concluding that the plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence
"establishing either the awareness of the plaintiffs of the alleged
misrepresentation and non-disclosure, or even if such awareness was to have
been established, that such reliance would have been justified." 199
3. The "Intentional Tort" Requirement
The majority of courts have held that the tort underlying a civil conspiracy
claim must be intentional.20 0 For example, a federal district court in
Sonnenreich v. Philip Morris Inc.20 ' dismissed a civil conspiracy claim because
it was largely based on negligence.20 2 The court reasoned that the claim must
fail because it was impossible to conspire to be negligent. 20 3 The court did,
however, allow the plaintiff to amend her complaint to allege that the
conduct by suppressing information about the
defendants engaged in fraudulent
24
health risks of smoking. 0
In contrast, some courts have concluded that negligence, or even strict
liability, can satisfy the underlying tort requirement for a civil conspiracy
claim. 2°5 The Iowa Supreme Court in Wright v. Brooke GroupLtd.206 declared
that an intentional tort was not necessary to support a civil conspiracy claim as
long as the underlying acts were independently actionable.20 7 In addition, a
195. Id.at 831.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.at 834.
199. Id.at 833.
200. Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 391,395 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Sonnenreich
v. Philip Morris Inc., 929 F. Supp. 416, 419 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Altman v. Fortune Brands, Inc.,
701 N.Y.S.2d 615, 615 (App. Div. 2000) (mem.); Geiger v. Am. Tobacco Co., 696 N.Y.S.2d
345, 350 (Sup. Ct. 1999); Cresser v. Am. Tobacco Co., 662 N.Y.S.2d 374,378 (Sup. Ct. 1997);
Goldstein v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 854 A.2d 585, 590 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
201. 929 F. Supp. 416.
202. Id.at 419-20.
203. Id.at 419.
204. Id.at 420.
205. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593,
633-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Sackman, 965 F. Supp. at 396; Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652
N.W.2d 159, 173 (Iowa 2002).
206. 652 N.W.2d 159.
207. Id.at 174.
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federal court in Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc.,2 °8 after declaring that a claim
of civil conspiracy requires a showing of intentional conduct, 20 9 dismissed the
plaintiffs' negligence-based claim but surprisingly refused to dismiss a claim
based on conspiracy to market a defective product.2 10 After discussing cases on
both sides of the issue, the court concluded that new law regarding civil
conspiracy and products liability was developing so rapidly
2 that it was
premature to dismiss a claim based on strict products liability. I
In the MTBE case, the defendants also argued that the plaintiffs' civil
conspiracy claim must fail because they had not alleged an underlying
intentional tort. 212 The court acknowledged that in order to incur liability the
defendants must have agreed to commit an intentional act; therefore, negligent
failure to warn could not serve as the underlying tort in the civil conspiracy
claim. 213 The plaintiffs, though, had alleged that the defendants had
intentionallymisrepresented and suppressed information about MTBE.214 The
court concluded that the defendants' alleged failure to warn was intentional, not
negligent, and the claim could go forward.21 5 The court also declared that
because the defendants intentionally marketed a product that they knew was
defect claim might
unreasonably dangerous, the plaintiffs' strict liability design
216
also qualify as an underlying tort for civil conspiracy.
4. Statutory Claims
Jefferson v. Lead IndustriesAss 'n217 represents an interesting twist on the
underlying tort requirement. The plaintiff in Jefferson brought a class action
against various lead-based paint pigment manufacturers and their trade
association, seeking recovery under the Louisiana Products Liability Act
(LPLA) 2 18 for victims of lead poisoning. 21 9 The district court had dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) 220 because she could not
identify the manufacturers who made the product that caused the harm and

208. 965 F. Supp. 391.
209. Id. at 395.
210. Id. at 396.
211. Id. at 395-96. But cf Goldstein v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 854 A.2d 585,590 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2004) (stating that "[s]trict liability and negligence counts are insufficient to support [a] civil
conspiracy claim").
212. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593,
633 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 633-34.
215. Id. at 634-35.
216. Id. at 634.
217. 106 F.3d 1245 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
218. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.52 (1998).
219. Jefferson, 106 F.3d at 1246.
220. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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because she failed to state a cause of action based upon civil conspiracy. 2 ' In
response, the plaintiff asked the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to certify
certain questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court, including whether
defendants could be held jointly liable under the civil conspiracy provisions of
the Louisiana Civil Code based on their alleged violation of the LPLA and
other torts.222 The Fifth Circuit, however, refused to certify the plaintiff's
questions and instead incorporated the trial court's analysis by reference into its
own opinion.223
The trial court observed that the LPLA provides the only available theories
of manufacturer liability for injuries caused by their products. 24 The statute
identified a number of liability theories, such as defective design and failure to
warn, but required that the plaintiff identify the defective product's
manufacturer. 215 The plaintiff in Jefferson tried to avoid this hurdle by
charging the defendants with civil conspiracy. 226 However, the court concluded
that civil conspiracy was not a permissible theory of liability under the
LPLA.227
On the other hand, the court acknowledged that the Act did not apply to
221
non-manufacturers, such as the defendant trade association, so the plaintiff
could maintain an action for civil conspiracy against the trade association if she
could establish the existence of an underlying tort.229 In this case, the plaintiff
pleaded fraudulent misrepresentation but was unable to demonstrate reliance on
In fact, the
the trade association's alleged misrepresentations. 230
representations were made many years before the plaintiff was born. 23' By the
time the plaintiff's injury occurred, the dangers of lead pigment were well
known and lead-based paint had been legally banned for residential use for
more than twenty years. 232 Because the plaintiff was unable to make out a
prima facie case of fraudulent misrepresentation, the court dismissed her civil
conspiracy claim against the Lead Industries Association.23 3

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Jefferson, 106 F.3d at 1246.
Id. at 1246-47.
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1251.
Id.
Id. at 1251-52.
Id. at 1253.
See id. at 1253-54.
Id. at 1254.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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C. The ConspiratorTheory of PersonalJurisdiction
In at least one instance, plaintiffs relied on a civil conspiracy claim to assert
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.234 In the North Dakota Asbestos
Litigation,235 residents of North Dakota brought suit against Cassiar, a
Canadian company that mined raw asbestos and sold it in Canada to American
manufacturers of asbestos products.2 36 Cassiar challenged the North Dakota
federal district court's jurisdiction on the basis that it had not sold products or
conducted any other business in North Dakota.23 7 In response, the plaintiffs
alleged that Cassiar participated in a conspiracy with American asbestos
manufacturers and the Asbestos Textile Institute (A.T.I.), an industry trade
association of which Cassiar was a member, to deceive the public about the
health risks of asbestos. 238 The court agreed that the plaintiffs had presented

sufficient evidence that the defendant had participated in a conspiracy.239
The court declared that it could assert personal jurisdiction over Cassiar
under "[t]he theory of conspirator jurisdiction" if the plaintiff presented prima
facie evidence of the conspiracy and any of the co-conspirators had "sufficient
minimum contacts" in North Dakota to be subject to personal jurisdiction.240
Personal jurisdiction can be asserted over an out-of-state corporation without
minimum contacts when another person or entity with minimum contacts in the
forum state acted as its alter ego. This required the court to consider: (1) "the
nature and quality of' the alleged conspirators' contacts with North Dakota, (2)
"the quantity of these contacts," (3) the relationship between the contacts and
the plaintiffs lawsuit, (4) North Dakota's interest, and (5) the parties'
convenience.24 2 With this in mind, the court considered whether the A.T.I. or
any 243
of its members with minimum contacts in the state acted as Cassiar's alter
ego. It concluded that the other A.T.I. members satisfied the five criteria for
minimum contacts 244 and that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of

civil conspiracy. 245 Therefore, the court refused to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim
against Cassiar for lack ofjurisdiction.2 46

234.

In re N.D. Pers. Injury Asbestos Litig. No. 1,737 F. Supp. 1087,1091 (D.N.D. 1990).

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
Id. at 1090.
Id. at 1089-90.
See Id. at 1096-97.
Id.at 1097.
Id.

241. Id. (citing Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Mgmt., Inc., 519
F.2d 634, 637 (8th Cir. 1975)).
242. Id. at 1094 (citing Wines v. Lake Havasu Boat Mfg., Inc., 846 F.2d 40,42 (8th Cir.
1988)).

243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
at 1095.
See Id
Id.
at 1098.
Id.
at 1099.
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D. Statutes of Limitation and Repose
The effect of civil conspiracy on a statute of limitations is nicely illustrated
by Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A. 247 The Grisham case involved certified
questions from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to the California
Supreme Court. 248 The plaintiffs claimed that they would not have begun to
smoke if they had known about the health hazards, nicotine's addictive
properties, the purposeful adjustment of nicotine levels, and the targeting of
underage consumers by tobacco companies. 249 Responding to the defendant's
assertion that their claims were barred by the statute of limitations, the plaintiffs
argued that the statute should be tolled if the defendant tobacco companies
were engaged in an ongoing conspiracy to defraud them and other smokers.
The lower court acknowledged that under California law the statute of
limitations would not begin to run until the conspiracy's "last overt act" was
completed.25' It concluded, however, that the plaintiffs' civil conspiracy claim
failed, so the statute of limitations had not been tolled and the plaintiffs' claims
were time barred.252 The underlying torts that supported the plaintiffs' civil
conspiracy claim were fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment, of which
justifiable reliance was an essential aspect.253 Although the plaintiffs alleged
that they were not aware of the risks of smoking until after they were addicted,
the lower court found that under California law the plaintiffs were presumed to
have constructive knowledge of addiction and the health risks of smokinA and,
therefore, could not have relied on the defendants' false statements. 2 On
appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the presumption of awareness about addiction
and the health risks of smoking was rebuttable, not conclusive. 5 Rather than
deciding this issue itself, however, the Ninth Circuit certified the matter to the
California Supreme Court for resolution.
The supreme court determined that the "discovery rule" is "[a]n important
exception to the general rule of accrual" of a cause of action. 257 The statute of
limitations on a claim does not begin to run until the plaintiff has reason to
suspect that the claim exists; this generally requires suspicion of one element of

247. 403 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
248. Id. at 632.
249. Id.
at 635.
250.
251.

See id.
See id. (citing Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 598 P.2d 45, 53 (Cal. 1979)).

252. Id.
at 635 & n.6.
253. See id. at 635-36.
254.

Id.at 635-36 (relying on Soliman v. Philip Morris, Inc., 311 F.3d 966, 973-76 (9th

Cir. 2002)).
255. See id.
at 636.
256. Id.at 632.
257. Grishamv. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc., 151 P.3d 1151, 1156 (Cal. 2007) (citing Fox v.
Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 110 P.3d 914, 920 (Cal. 2005)).
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the claim along with knowledge of at least one other element.258 The court then
rejected the special presumption upon which the district court had relied but
went on to acknowledge that "California law recognizes a general, rebuttable
presumption, that plaintiffs have 'knowledge of the wrongful cause of an
injury."'' 259 Therefore, in order to overcome this presumption and take
advantage of the discovery rule, the plaintiffs in Grisham were required to
plead facts "such as reasonable reliance on tobacco company
misrepresentations" that caused them to be unable to discover their addiction
and health problems.2 60
The court found that one plaintiff discovered her addiction-and therefore
her economic injury--outside the period of the statute of limitations, 261 but that
her physical injuries were sufficiently distinct from the addiction to support a
separate cause of action.262 Because her health problems could not reasonably
have been discovered until some time later, her causes of action based on them
were not barred by the statute of limitations.263 The other plaintiff, on the other
hand, did not allege that she discovered her injuries during the statute of
limitations period. 26 4 For this reason, she could only proceed with her claim if
she alleged that she relied on the defendants' misrepresentations when she
began smoking and that the ongoing civil conspiracy caused her justifiable
reliance to continue into the statute of limitations period. 265 Because she did
not adequately plead this point, the trial court would have to determine whether
to permit her to amend her complaint.2 66
Greene v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.267 involved a statute of
repose. In Greene, the widow of a smoker sued a number of cigarette
manufacturers, alleging negligence, strict liability, and civil conspiracy. 268 The
defendants moved to dismiss, contending that Tennessee's statute of repose
barred the plaintiff's claims.2 69 The statute declared that "'[a]ny action against
a manufacturer or seller of a product for injury to person or property caused by
its defective or unreasonably dangerous condition must be brought... within

258. Id. (citing Fox, 110 P.3d at 920).
259. Id. at 1159 (citing Fox, 110 P.3d at 920).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1159-60.
262. Id. at 1163.
263. Id. at 1164-65.
264. Id.at 1165.
265. Id.
266. Id. This issue is currently pending before the district court. Grisham v. Philip Morris
U.S.A., Nos. 03-55780 & 03-56018, 2007 WL 979842, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 3,2007), vacating
and remandingpercuriam Grisham v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. CV02-7930-SVW(RCX), 2003
WL 23340889 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2003) and Cannata v. Philip Morris USA Inc., No. CV028026 ABC(SHX), 2003 WL 23340890 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2003).
267. 72 F. Supp. 2d 882 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
268. Id. at 885.
269. Id.
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ten (10) years from the date on which the product was first purchased ....

27

Having determined that the statute barred the plaintiff's negligence and strict
liability
claims, the court considered whether it also barred the civil conspiracy
claim. 27
The court acknowledged that the civil conspiracy claim would fail if the
underlying tort was not actionable.272 The court also found that the underlying
torts-misrepresentation, concealment, and nondisclosure-were specifically
identified as "'product liability actions"' by the Tennessee code.273 In light of
the broad definition of "product liability action" in the statute and the close
interrelationship between the plaintiffs civil conspiracy claim and its
underlying fraud allegation, the court concluded that the statute of repose must
also bar the civil conspiracy claim.274 Consequently, the court dismissed the
negligence, strict liability, and civil conspiracy claims insofar as these claims
were based on cigarette
sales made more than ten years prior to the filing of the
275
plaintiffs lawsuit.

E. A FinalAssessment
Over the years, plaintiffs have relied on civil conspiracy claims to extend
liability to additional manufacturers or trade associations when the actual
wrongdoer cannot be identified.276 Plaintiffs have also invoked civil conspiracy
to assert personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants 277 and to avoid the
effects of statutes of limitation or repose.278 Interestingly, the majority of these
civil conspiracy claims have not been well received.
Civil conspiracy claims have been most successful in litigation against
tobacco companies. Plaintiffs in those cases prevailed against motions to
dismiss and motions for summary judgment in slightly less than half of the
reported cases surveyed by this author. 279 A respectable number of civil
270.

Id. at 886 n.4 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (Supp. 1998)).

271.

Id. at 887.

272. Id.
273. Id. (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(6) (Supp. 1998)).
274. Id. The plaintiff argued unsuccessfully that barring a suit forfraudulentconcealment
was against Tennessee public policy. Id. at 887-88. Neither the plaintiff nor the court seems to
have addressed the fact that the relevant statute refers only to "negligent or innocent" behavior.
§ 29-28-102(6).
275. Id. at 888.
276. E.g., Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 793 N.E.2d 869, 879 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
277. In re N.D. Pers. Injury Asbestos Litig. No. 1,737 F. Supp. 1087, 1099 (D.N.D. 1990).
278. See Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., 403 F.3d 631, 635-36 (9th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam); Greene v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 882, 887-88 (W.D.
Tenn. 1999).
279. Hearn v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 279 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1117-18 (D. Ariz. 2003);
Waterhouse v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 270 F. Supp. 2d 678, 686 (D. Md. 2003); Greene,
72 F. Supp. 2d at 893; Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 391, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1997);
Cresser v. Am. Tobacco Co., 662 N.Y.S.2d 374, 380-81 (Sup. Ct. 1997); see also Wright v.
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conspiracy claims have also survived pretrial motions by defendants in asbestos
cases. 280 On the other hand, plaintiffs have had only modest success with civil
conspiracy claims in lead paint cases 28' and conspiracy claims have been
largely rejected in most other cases.282 This suggests that many courts are
suspicious of civil conspiracy claims in products liability cases and, therefore,
insist that all of the traditional requirements for products liability torts be
strictly met.
V. CONCERNS ABOUT CIVIL CONSPIRACY CLAIMS
There are a number of possible explanations for the courts' hostile attitudes
to civil conspiracy claims. First, courts appear to dislike collective liability
theories because they are inconsistent with the requirement of a causal
relationship between a wrongdoer and the injured party. Another explanation is
that courts believe that liability concerns cause manufacturers to invest
excessive resources in accident cost avoidance measures or to withdraw useful
products from the market. Courts have also been reluctant to intrude on
defendants' First Amendment freedoms of expression and association. Finally,
courts may be unwilling to encourage civil conspiracy claims because they
often involve issues that are better addressed by other branches of government.

Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 174 (Iowa 2002) (answering a certified question by
holding that civil conspiracy charges may be based on negligence and strict liability); cf.
Sonnenreich v. Philip Morris Inc., 929 F. Supp. 416,420 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (granting the motion
to dismiss but giving the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint with respect to the underlying
tort). But see Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 377 F.3d 917, 927 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming
summary judgment in favor of defendants); Allegheny General Hospital v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
228 F.3d 429, 446 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal ofplaintiffls conspiracy claim); Brown v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 506, 517 n. 10 (D.N.J. 2002) (granting summary judgment
for defendants); Estate of White v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 F. Supp. 2d 424, 430 (D.
Md. 2000) (granting summary judgment for defendants); Kyte v. Philip Morris, Inc., 556
N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (Mass. 1990) (holding that defendants were entitled to summary judgment
on civil conspiracy claim); Altman v. Fortune Brands, Inc., 710 N.Y.S.2d 615, 615-16 (App.
Div. 2000) (affirming dismissal of civil conspiracy claim).
280. Univ. Sys. of N.H. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 756 F. Supp. 640,653 (D.N.H. 1991); In re
N.D. Pers. Injury Asbestos Litig. No. 1, 737 F. Supp. 1087, 1097 (D.N.D. 1990); Town of
Hooksett Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 617 F. Supp. 126, 136 (D.N.H. 1984);Nicolet, Inc. v.
Nutt, 525 A.2d 146, 150 (Del. 1987); Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 645 N.E.2d 888, 895 (I11.
1995).
281. Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 793 N.E.2d 869, 879 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
282. No civil conspiracy claim seems to have been allowed against DES manufacturers or
the manufacturers of any other pharmaceutical product. So far, courts have also rejected civil
conspiracy claims against the manufacturers of wheel rims. The only other group of
manufacturers against whom plaintiffs have been successful are the makers of MTBE. See In re
Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 635 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
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A. Causationand CorrectiveJustice
In a civil case, the plaintiff ordinarily must prove each element of the case,
including causation, by a preponderance of the evidence.283 In products
liability litigation, the plaintiff must prove, among other things, that the
defendant's product was the source of his or her injury.284 This requirement
often makes it difficult for plaintiffs to recover for injuries that have been
caused by common products such as cigarettes, asbestos, or lead-based paint.285
Parties injured by such products often use civil conspiracy and other forms of
collective liability to try to overcome causation-related proof problems.2 86
One might expect courts to embrace collective liability theories to bypass
oppressive causation requirements, but, in fact, they often seem reluctant to
allow civil conspiracy claims to go to trial. One possible explanation for this
judicial reluctance involves the concept of corrective justice. 287 Corrective
justice requires that one who is unjustly enriched at the expense288of another is
morally obligated to restore the victim to his former position.
Corrective
justice applies primarily to acts such as fraud and theft, in which the defendant
profits directly from his conduct.2 89 Moreover, it may also serve as a rationale
for tort doctrines in which the defendant has not directly profited from personal
injuries that nevertheless require compensation. 290 The case for collective
liability, however, is problematic when the defendant does not breach a
particularized duty owed to the plaintiff.291 In other words, the wrongful act
"'and the transfer of resources that undoes it' . . . constitute 'a single nexus of
activity and passivity where actor and victim are defined in relation to each
other.' ' 292 Courts that adhere to this view of corrective justice may resist
collective liability theories because they blur the requirement
of a duty-based
93
relationship between the wrongdoer and the victim.2

283. 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1311 (2007).
284. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 188 (Mass. 1982); see Donald G. Gifford,
The Challengeto the Individual CausationRequirement in Mass Products Torts, 62 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 873, 875 (2005).
285. Gifford, supra note 279, at 875-76.
286. Id.at 876.
287. See generally id.
at 881-90.
288. See Alan L. Calnan, Distributiveand Corrective Justice Issues in Contemporary
Tobacco Litigation, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 577, 602-03 (1998); Jules Coleman, CorrectiveJustice
and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STuD. 421, 423 (1982); Gifford, supra note 279, at 886.
289. See Calnan, supranote 283, at 602-04.
290. See id.
at 603-04.
291. See Gifford, supra note 279, at 885 (citing ERNEST J. WEINRm, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE
LAW 125, 142-44 (1995)).
292. Id. at 885 (quoting WEINRm, supra note 286, at 56).
293. See id.at 881-83.
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B. Deterrence and Overdeterrence

The deterrence rationale for strict products liability is based on the notion
that product manufacturers who engage in risky production or marketing
practices should internalize the costs of product-based injuries that would
otherwise fall on society.294 When a manufacturer is not held responsible for
product-related injuries, it will not take those injuries into account when
deciding how much money to allocate to product safety. 295 A manufacturer
who is required to compensate consumers for their injuries will have an
incentive to reduce its liability exposure by reducing the occurrence of those
injuries.2 96 In other words, a manufacturer who is held liable for productrelated injuries will spend money on product safety when the marginal cost of
accident reduction is less than the marginal reduction of potential liability.297
On the other hand, the deterrent effect of tort liability may be lessened
when injured parties fail to sue, when they recover nothing at trial, or when
they accept a minimal settlement to avoid the emotional or financial costs of
litigation.
If this is true, then civil conspiracy and other forms of collective
liability may offset the effects of underdeterrence by enabling injured
consumers to avoid product identification and other causation problems that
otherwise prevent them from recovering against manufacturers of defective
products.
Collective liability may also lead to overdeterrence when the liability
assessed against a manufacturer exceeds the damage actually suffered by
accident victims. To illustrate, if a product's total accident costs equal $100
million, the manufacturer should spend no more than that amount on product
safety. If, however, expected tort recoveries exceed actual accident costs by
$50 million, the manufacturer will spend up to $150 million to avoid tort
liability. Spending $150 million to prevent $100 million in accident costs is an
inefficient allocation of resources.
Overdeterrence not only causes excessive spending on accident cost
avoidance, it may also induce manufacturers to take useful products off the
market because of concerns about potential tort liability. 299 The experience of
the pharmaceutical industry suggests that this form of overdeterrence is a
294.

George L. Priest, The Invention of EnterpriseLiability: A CriticalHistory of the
STUD. 461, 520 (1985).
295. See Raymond E. Gangarosa et al., Suits by PublicHospitals to Recover Expenditures
for the Treatment of Disease, Injury and Disability Caused by Tobacco and Alcohol, 22
FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 81, 81-82 (1994).
296. See Craig Brown, Deterrence and Accident Compensation Schemes, 17 U.W.
ONTARIO L. REV. 111, 128 (1979); Priest, supranote 289, at 520.
297. James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The
Imprisonmentof CorporateRationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 768 (1983).
298. See Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 796-98 (1990).
299. See MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE
LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 84 (1996).
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serious problem. 300 For example, in response to tort claims against vaccine
manufacturers, a number of manufacturers have left the business since 1968.30 1
This litigation also led to an extraordinary rise in vaccine prices.30 2 Fear of
massive tort liability caused the manufacturer of Bendectin, an anti-nausea
drug, to withdraw it from the market.30 3 Therefore, courts that are concerned
about the effects of overdeterrence are likely to view civil conspiracy claims
with a jaundiced eye.
C. FirstAmendment Issues
Courts also have frequently expressed concern that civil conspiracy liability
interferes with defendants' abilit%to exercise their First Amendment rights of
free expression and association.
1. Freedom of Expression
The First Amendment declares that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech ....
,,30 Courts have interpreted this language
to mean that the government cannot regulate speech based on subject matter or
viewpoint and any such regulation must be necessary to support a compelling
governmental interest. 30 6 This First Amendment protection is not limited to
political or artistic expression but also extends to commercial speech to a lesser

300. See, e.g., id. at 84-85 (describing how liability concerns caused Dow Coming,
DuPont, and other biomaterials providers to stop producing these materials in the 1990s).
301. W. Kip Viscusi et al., DeterringInefficient PharmaceuticalLitigation:An Economic
Rationalefor the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 1437, 1471
(1994).
302. Id. at 1471-72.
303. Id. at 1473-74.
304. In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F.3d 781, 792 (3d Cir. 1999)
(freedom of speech); In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 46 F.3d 1284, 1286, 1288 (3d Cir. 1994)
(freedom of speech and association); see also Chavers v. Gatke Corp., 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198,
206-07 (Ct. App. 2003) (freedom of association).
305. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
306. Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,230 (1987); Regan v. Time, Inc.,
468 U.S. 641, 648 (1984).

2007]

PRODUCTSLIABILITY CONSPIRACY

degree.3 °7 These First Amendment restrictions apply to common law tort
doctrines as well as to statutes and administrative regulations. 0 8
Defendants raised freedom of speech issues in the OrthopedicBone Screw
Products Liability Litigation,3 ° which involved civil conspiracy claims by
thousands of plaintiffs against the manufacturers and distributors of orthopedic
bone screw devices and their trade associations.3 10 The plaintiffs maintained
that the manufacturers of bone screw devices gave royalties and stock options
to surgeons and other health care professionals in exchange for speaking at
"seminars" which purported to show other doctors how to use these devices.1
According to the plaintiffs, these were "purely commercial" seminars
"conducted in the guise of educati[on]." 31 2 The physicians who spoke at them
failed to discuss that the FDA had not approved these devices for pedicle
fixation surgery and they failed to inform their audiences that clinical trials had
revealed potentially serious safety problems with these devices.31 3 The
plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants paid various trade associations to hold
seminars advocating the use of bone screw devices and concealing critical
information about the safety of bone screw devices. 31 4 Later, the defendants
allegedly created an industry trade association to conduct a study of pedicle
screw fixation which, according to the plaintiffs, "was an intentional fraud,
relying on selective data and ignoring unfavorable results. 3 15
The defendants moved to dismiss all of the claims that were based on the
speech at the seminars.31 6 The district court refused, finding that the plaintiffs
had "allege[d] false and misleading commercial speech, which does not qualify
307. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 56163 (1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,456 (1978); see Lars Noah, Authors,
Publishers, and ProductsLiability: Remedies for Defective Information in Books, 77 OR. L.
REV. 1195, 1224-25 (1998) (stating that restrictions on commercial speech receive "a form of
intermediate scrutiny... providing that false or misleading commercial speech receives no
protection"). See generally Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the FirstAmendment,
81 IOWA L. REV. 589 (1996) (arguing that regulating tobacco marketing threatens First
Amendment rights).
308. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (holding that the First
Amendment restricts a public figure's ability to recover for intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (finding that the First
Amendment "require[s] that state remedies for defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is
necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved"); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 279-80 (1964) (concluding that the First Amendment "prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood" absent a showing of "actual malice").
309. 193 F.3d 781 (3d Cir. 1999).
310. Id. at 784-85.
311. Id. at 786.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 786-87.
314. Id. at787.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 788.

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:383

for First Amendment protection. 3 17 The appeals court acknowledged that the
First Amendment provides less protection to commercial speech than to other
forms of expression, particularly where it was false or misleading.318 The court
also declared that "[w]here the commercial and noncommercial elements of
speech are 'inextricably intertwined,' the court must apply the 'test for fully
protected expression.' 3 19 In this case, the court found that it was too early in
the lawsuit to decide exactly what parts of the seminars, if any, constituted sales
promotions and what parts were educational in nature. 32 0 Accordingly, the
court concluded that the factual dispute about the character of the seminars was
sufficient to preclude the defendants' motion.32 1
2. Freedom of Association
Freedom of association is also protected by the First Amendment. 3212 As the
Supreme Court observed, "[e]ffective advocacy.., is undeniably enhanced by
group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking
upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly." 323 In
NAACP v. ClaiborneHardwareCo., 324 the Court extended this constitutional
protection to a conspiracy-based tort, concluding that membership in the
NAACP was protected conduct and its innocent members could not be held
liable for the tortious acts of other members. 325 Liability for illegal acts that
occurred as part of an NAACP-organized boycott was unconstitutional unless
"the group itself possessed unlawful goals and . . . the [defendant] held a
specific intent to further those illegal aims. 326
Freedom of association may also be implicated when plaintiffs seek to hold
individual members of a trade association liable for a conspiracy involving the
trade association. Of course, the trade association itself can be held liable for
its participation in a conspiracy.327 Mere membership in a trade association,
though, will not cause innocent members to be held liable for a conspiracy
317. Id.
318. Id.at 792.
319. Id. at 793 (quoting Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind ofN.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796
(1988)).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging.., the right of the
Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v. City
people peaceably to assemble .. ");
of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (per curiam);
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
323. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
324. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
325. James M. Beck, ConstitutionalProtection of Scientific and EducationalActivities
from Tort Liability: The FirstAmendment as a Defense to PersonalInjury Litigation, 37 TORT
& INS. L.J. 981, 984 (2002).
326. Id.(quoting ClaiborneHardware,458 U.S. at 920).
327. See infra Part IV.A.3.
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carried out by other members. 328 In the Asbestos School Litigation,329 asbestos
manufacturer Pfizer sought to vacate a lower court's denial of its partial
summary judgment motion on the plaintiffs' civil conspiracy and concert of
action claims, contending that the imposition of tort liability would interfere
with the exercise of its First Amendment rights. 330 The plaintiff school districts
claimed that the defendant and other manufacturers had sold asbestoscontaining building products (ACBPs), which they knew were dangerous,
without warning about the health risks of asbestos. 33' They also alleged that the
manufacturers had been acting as part of a civil conspiracy.332 As evidence of
Pfizer's participation in the conspiracy, the plaintiffs alleged that Pfizer had
marketed an ACBP known as Kilnoise from 1964 until 1972 and that it joined
The
a trade organization, Safe Buildings Alliance (SBA), in 1984.
manufacturers described the SBA as a "lobbying and public education
organization" that represented the asbestos product manufacturers before state
and federal legislators, the EPA and other agencies, and the public.33 4 The
defendant argued that "' [s]haring and discussing information which is a matter
of public record and debate in a voluntary association such as the SBA
335is
neither a conspiracy nor a concert of action that was in any way illegal. '1
The lower court had refused to dismiss the civil conspiracy and concert of
action claims, finding that "'there [was] evidence by which a jury could
reasonably find that Pfizer laterjoined an ongoing conspiracy/concert of action
' ''
by its involvement with, and financial support for . . . [the SBA]. 336
Specifically, the district court stated that the plaintiffs had provided evidence
that the SBA's actions were not just educational but "were also aimed in part at
convincing the public that SBA members had no prior knowledge of the
dangers of asbestos" when they marketed asbestos products.337 In the court's
view, "[these] actions 'could reasonably be interpreted by ajury as contributing
to an ongoing conspiracy to conceal the asbestos industry's alleged knowledge
of the dangers of asbestos." 338
339
the
Relying on the Supreme Court's reasoning in ClaiborneHardware,
Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs' civil conspiracy and concert of action
claims were trumped by Pfizer's First Amendment rights. 340 The court declared
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

See infra Part IV.A.3.
46 F.3d 1284 (3d Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1286.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1287.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting the district court opinion) (alteration in original).
Id. at 1288 (quoting the district court opinion).
Id. (quoting the district court opinion).
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 46 F.3d at 1286.
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that "[j]oining organizations that participate in public debate, making
contributions to them, and attending their meetings are activities that enjoy
substantial First Amendment protection." 341 Rejecting the plaintiffs' "ongoing
conspiracy" theory, the court ruled that the defendant could not be held liable
for the tortious acts of other asbestos manufacturers simply because it had a
"limited and (as far as the record reflects) innocent association with the
SBA. ' 3 42 This sort of vicarious liability, in the court's view, would make
legitimate educational and lobbying activities "unjustifiably risky
343 and would
undoubtedly have an unwarranted inhibiting effect upon them.",
Freedom of association was also involved in Chavers v. Gatke Corp.34 In
Chavers, a former automobile mechanic sued various manufacturers of
asbestos-containing friction brake products, alleging that exposure to these
products caused his cancer. 345 The plaintiff conceded that he had no evidence
that he was ever exposed to asbestos products manufactured by defendant
Gatke Corporation but sought to hold it liable on theories of civil conspiracy
and concert of action. 346 The plaintiff's conspiracy claim was based on the
defendant's involvement with Saranac Laboratory, a private research facility.347
According to the plaintiffs expert witness, beginning in 1936 a number of
asbestos manufacturers, including the defendant, provided research funds to
Saranac Laboratory to investigate the health effects of asbestos products.34 8
Saranac's researchers found that exposure to asbestos products posed serious
health risks, including cancer, but at the insistence of some of the companies
that financed its research, Saranac deleted all references to cancer in its
published report. 3 49 According to the plaintiff, the suppression of this
information by those funding the research was "a tortious failure to warn
potential users" of the health risks of asbestos exposure.350
The state appellate court upheld the trial court's decision not to instruct the
jury on the civil conspiracy claim since the plaintiff had not pled an underlying
tort. 35 1 The court also held that a concert of action instruction would have been
inappropriate, in part because such claims cannot be based solely on
membership in trade associations or research consortiums.35 2 A review of the
record convinced the court that there was no evidence to support the claim that
Gatke, which had contributed only $250 a year to Saranac Laboratory,
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

Id.at 1294.
Id.
Id.
132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198 (Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 199.
Id.
Id. at 200.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id at 201-03.
See id. at 206-07.
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"possessed the specific intent to promote the sale of asbestos products" on an
industry-wide basis; rather, it seemed to have sought access to Saranac's
research primarily to assist in defending against workers' compensation
claims.353 Quoting from In re Asbestos School Litigation,354 the court declared
that
requiring a manufacturer "to stand trial for civil conspiracy and concert of
action predicated solely on its exercise of its First Amendment freedoms
could generally chill the exercise of the freedom of association by those who
wish to contribute to... and otherwise associate with trade 355
groups and other
organizations that engage in public advocacy and debate."
D. InstitutionalCompetence
As Professor Donald Gifford has pointed out, courts may also be reluctant
to embrace collective liability theories, such as civil conspiracy, because they
believe that legislative and administrative bodies rather than the judiciary,
should determine economic and regulatory policy.356 In the 1980s and 1990s,
the issue of institutional competence arose in connection with product category
liability. 357 Under the theory of product category liability, courts could hold
manufacturers strictly liable for injuries caused by inherently dangerous
products because the accident costs they generate outweigh the benefits to
public consumers.3 58 Plaintiffs' attorneys have invoked this liability theory,
usually without much success, against the manufacturers of such inherently9
dangerous products as asbestos, cigarettes, firearms, and alcoholic beverages.
Commentators, however, have condemned product category liability for
two reasons. First, the adversarial nature of litigation and the courts' limited
access to information make them ill-suited to make generic determinations of
risk and utility. 360 Second, product category liability gives courts the power to
353. Id.
354. 46 F.3d 1284, 1295-96 (3d Cir. 1994).
355. Chavers, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 207.
356. Gifford, supranote 279, at 934.
357. See generally Richard C. Ausness, ProductCategoryLiability: A CriticalAnalysis,
24 N. KY. L. REv. 423,451-52,451 nn. 190-91 (1997) (citing cases that found legislative bodies
and administrative agencies could best make policy in product category liability matters).
358. Michael J. T6ke, Note, CategoricalLiabilityforManifestly UnreasonableDesigns:
Why the Comment d Caveat Should Be Removedfrom the Restatement (Third), 81 CORNELL L.
REv. 1181, 1185 (1996).
359. See, e.g., Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1224 (1 st Cir. 1990) (cigarette
manufacturers); Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1533 (11th Cir. 1986)
(handgun manufacturers); Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 112 (La.
1986) (asbestos manufacturers); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 306 (N.J. 1983)
(manufacturers of above-ground swimming pools); Dauphin Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v.
Toyota Motor Corp., 596 A.2d 845, 849 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (manufacturers of alcoholic
beverages).
360. Harvey M. Grossman, Categorical Liability: Why the Gates Should Be Kept Closed,
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impose massive liability upon manufacturers and, therefore, potentially to
decide whether entire classes of products such as firearms or cigarettes, will
continue to be produced and consumed. 36 Opponents of product category
liability argued that "legislative" decisions with this much power to shape
public policy should be left to the political process rather than being made by
the courts.
The first of these "institutional competence" critiques is probably not
applicable to civil conspiracy and other collective liability theories. While it
might be difficult for courts to weigh risks and benefits in a product category
case, it is not particularly difficult for them to ascertain whether or not the
defendants have engaged in a conspiracy. Furthermore, the underlying tort in a
civil conspiracy case is usually fraud-a concept with which courts are familiar.
The second critique, though, applies as clearly to civil conspiracy as it does
to product category liability. Because civil conspiracy in products liability
cases usually involves an entire industry and because such cases often involve
class actions and punitive damages, it is quite possible that a plaintiff's
judgment will economically cripple or even bankrupt an entire industry.
Recognizing that their institutional role is not to decide the fate of an industry,
view civil conspiracy claims with some degree of
courts unsurprisingly
36
skepticism.
VI. CONCLUSION

Civil conspiracy claims provide plaintiffs with a potentially very useful
theory in product liability cases. Because each member of a conspiracy is held
jointly and severally liable, a plaintiff does not carry the burden of proving
which defendant caused the injury. A successful civil conspiracy claim may
also extend the statute of limitations and enable a plaintiff to obtain personal
jurisdiction over nonresident parties. Unfortunately for plaintiffs, courts have
not been very receptive to civil conspiracy claims and have required plaintiffs
to prove each element of their claim with highly credible evidence.
In general, this is a good policy. Courts should treat civil conspiracy claims
with caution because those claims weaken the requirement that there be a
causal relationship between a wrongdoer and the injured party. In addition,
they create the risk of massive industry-wide liability, perhaps inducing
manufacturers to overinvest in accident cost avoidance measures or to withdraw
useful products from the market. Finally, civil conspiracy claims can threaten
First Amendment freedoms and often involve policy issues that would be better
resolved by other branches of government.
36 S. TEX. L. REV. 385, 407 (1995); Kim D. Larsen, Note, Strict ProductsLiability and the
Risk-Utility Testfor Design Defect: An Economic Analysis, 84 COLuM. L. REv. 2045, 2059-61
(1984); Note, Handguns and ProductsLiability, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1912, 1925 (1984).
361. See Grossman, supra note 355, at 405-06.
362. See id.
363. Gifford, supra note 279, at 934.

